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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
FAYE DORIS HURST,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 890129-CA

vs,
LARRY W.HURST,
Defendant and
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Rules 3 (a) and 4(a) of the Utah Court of Appeals
confer Jurisdiction upon this court to hear this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce and Judgment
entered January 30, 1989 by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, of the
Third District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Were the restrictions on Defendant's right to
visitation justified in the Findings of Fact and in the record?
2. Was the child support order justified in the
Findings of Fact and in the Record?
3. Was the restraining order justified by the record?
4. Was the requirement that the Defendant provide life
insurance justified by the Findings of Fact and the Record?
5. Was the division of marital property justified in
the Findings of Fact and by the Record?
6. Was the award of attorneyfs fees justified by the
Findings of Fact and by the Record?
7. Was the judgment against the Defendant justified by
the Findings of Fact and by the Record?
8. Were the issues presented in this appeal properly
preserved for review?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISION
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of this case.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Complaint was filed in this matter on August 13,
1987 (R 2 ) , after the parties had already been separated for one
year (R 18). An Order to Show Cause hearing came before
Commissioner Peuler, and over Defendant's objections, her
recommendations were upheld, including the recommendation that
Defendant maintain any life insurance policies currently in effect
(R 37-39).
On October 27, 1987, Plaintiff mailed Plaintiff's
Interrogatories and Request for Admissions, and Request for
Production of Documents to Defendant (R 36). Defendant responded
to the Request for Admissions, but failed to respond to the
Interrogatories or Request for Production of Documents, and on
December 23, 1987, Plaintiff moved the court for an Order
Compelling Answers to Interrogatories and Reply to Request for
Production of Documents (R 49). A hearing on this motion took
place on January 22, and the court ordered Defendant to respond (R
79), reserving for later the issue of attorney's fees (R 79).
This matter came on for trial on September 26, 1988 in
the Third District Court with the honorable Judge Raymond S. Uno
presiding.
Prior to the trial, the court met with counsel in
chambers wherein the matter was discussed thoroughly and certain
3

representations made (TR 3 ) . Also, certain stipulations of
counsel were made concerning Defendant's restricted visitation
(TR 4/6), and the value of the parties1 marital home and real
property (TR 7 ) . There is no transcript of what was said or what
representations were made in the court's chambers,
A rather informal trial was held.

Plaintiff testified

to the effect that ISAT had required Defendant to leave the
marital residence before the minor child could be returned to the
home (TR 21).
The Plaintiff's Financial Declaration (R 84-85) was
available to the court at the time of the trial stating her income
and expenditures, but the Defendant had failed to submit a
Financial Declaration, even though the Notice of Pretrial
Settlement Conference specifically informed the Defendant of
certain consequences of his failure to file a Financial
Declaration (R 83)• There was lengthy testimony concerning
Defendant's income and benefits from Ms. Betty Phelps, the Human
Resources Coordinator of the Defendant's employer, Newspaper
Agency Corporation.
In Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Plaintiff requested
that the court order Defendant to maintain existing life insurance
on his life (R 7 ) .

In Commissioner Peuler's Temporary Order, the

Defendant was ordered to maintain current life insurance on his
4

life (R 38). In Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's
Interrogatories, Defendant stated that he was going to let a life
insurance policy lapse (R 106). In trial, Ms. Phelps testified
that a life insurance policy in the amount of Defendant's yearly
earnings was available to Defendant at minimal cost (TR 15).
As to the division of the Defendant's pension, there was
a proffer of testimony from Charles E. Petersen of Frank Stuart
and Associates, who was present at the trial, that the value of
the Defendant's pension was $76,328.00 and that during the
pendency of the action Defendant had received $18,316.63 payments
from the pension plan (TR 5 ) . A complete analysis was submitted
on what was marked as Defendant's Exhibit 2 (R 120). The parties
agreed on the value of the parties' marital residence at
$37,000.00 (TR 6 ) . Using these valuations, the court entered its
Findings of Fact stating that the marital residence would go to
Plaintiff. The court further found that the $18,316.63 that
Defendant had received from his pension after the separation of
the parties but for which Defendant had failed to make any
accounting, along with 10% simple interest on that amount, would
be considered in determining the Plaintiff's share of the pension.
The court determined that the entire pension was a marital asset,
and to compensate for Plaintiff's receiving the marital residence
which was worth almost $17,000.00 more than the pre-dissolution
5

pension payments the Defendant had received, the court determined
that 39% of each pension payment would go to Plaintiff and that
the remaining 61% would go to Defendant (TR 316-319).
While the court and the counsel met in chambers,
Plaintiff's counsel proffered that his requested attorney's fees
were necessary and reasonable.

This proffer was not transcribed.

Evidence of this testimony is apparent in the court's minute entry
that $1,500.00 in attorney's fees had been awarded to Plaintiff (R
94).

The Plaintiff's need for attorney's fees is apparent in the

Financial Declaration that Plaintiff filed (R 84-88).

In its

Findings of Fact, the court clearly finds that the ordered
attorney's fees were necessary and reasonable and based on
Plaintiff's need (R 328-329).
The court determined that the additional judgment for
$1,100.00 was necessary due to the fact that the valuation of the
pension was as of the trial date, but the Decree was not entered
until the end of January, 198 9.

If this had not been done,

Defendant would have received four pension payments without any
accountability to the Plaintiff.

This is made clear in the Decree

(R 336) .
The Defendant objected to Plaintiff's proposed Findings
of Fact and a hearing was held to determine the issues raised in
the Defendant's Objections, in which the court took the matter
6

under advisement (R 131,132).

After the hearing, pursuant to the

court's request, the Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum of Points
and Authorities supporting the Plaintiff's position.

After

receiving the Plaintiff's Memorandum, the court asked the
Defendant for an opposing memorandum (R 204), but the Defendant
failed to submit one.

Thereafter, the court asked the Plaintiff

to submit new Findings of Fact in accordance with his Memorandum
and what had been determined at the hearing (R 310). A new set of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted and entered
by the court with no further objections from the Defendant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Plaintiff's main argument is that the Findings of
Fact set forth a fair and equitable amount of child support, child
visitation, life insurance, property division, and attorney's
fees, and that these matters are supported by the record and by
the stipulation of the parties.
The second argument is that the record before the Court
of Appeals is not a record of the entire proceedings and does not
reflects the arguments, representations and stipulations made by
the parties in the court's chambers.

Since it is the duty of the

Appellant to provide the appellate court with the complete record,
the appellate court should affirm the lower court's decision.
The third argument that Plaintiff will raise is that the
7

Defendant failed to argue his points in the lower court, so he
should be denied the opportunity to argue his points at the
appellate level.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE RESTRICTION ON DEFENDANT'S
VISITATION WAS PROPER
After meeting in chambers, without any transcriptions
taking place, the parties stipulated that Defendant's visitation
with the minor child would be with the approval of Judith Pugh of
ISAT.

Findings of Fact can be set aside on appeal only if they

are clearly erroneous, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a).
Whether Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous cannot be
determined "unless an Appellant first marshals all the evidence
that supports the trial court's finding."

Bake v. Bake, 772 P. 2d

461, 465-466 (Utah Ct. App., 1989), see also, Cornish Town v.
Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah, 1988); and, Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1983).

It is

apparent from the transcript that representations were made in
chambers and that stipulations concerning these representations
were agreed upon (TR 4 ) . Since the Appellant has failed to
provide the Court of Appeals with any record of what was said or
represented in chambers, any arguments as to the insufficiency of
the record to support the findings should be denied.
8

The parties stipulated that Defendant's visitation with
the minor child be limited by the direction of Judith Pugh (TR 4 ) .
The Defendant should now be bound by what he stipulated to.
"Stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties unless
good cause is demonstrated warranting relief therefrom," Sorenson
v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 820, 833 (Utah Ct. App., 1989).

Defendant

shows no good cause for not upholding the parties' stipulation and
only argues sufficiency of the evidence.

Plaintiff was available

to testify concerning visitation, but her testimony was not
proffered or elicited concerning visitation, because the parties
had stipulated concerning it (TR 5 ) . The Defendant should not be
allowed to avoid a stipulation because little testimony was heard
due to the very fact that the parties had stipulated to
visitation.
The record does have some indications of the reasons for
restricted visitation.

The Plaintiff testified that Protective

Services would not return the minor child to the marital residence
unless the Defendant moved out (TR 21). Defendant did not testify
as to why he should not be restricted in his visitation with his
daughter.

The court made findings that the parties were currently

being counseled through the ISAT center (R, 325). This finding is
based on the references to the ISAT center and the counselor Judy
Pugh (TR 4, 21). These references indicate that the court heard
9

of the role of the ISAT center before the trial began.
The facts that visitation was stipulated to between the
parties, that the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant was
ordered out of the house by Protective Services be^fore the minor
could be returned to the marital residence, that there was no
contradictory testimony from the Defendant, and that the court
made a finding which gave a basis for its conclusion as to limited
visitation, all support the Court of Appeals deciding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the
Defendant1s visitation.
Point II
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD WAS PROPER
Defendant consistently has failed to produce evidence of
his income, his expenses, his ability to pay, and his support of
others.

As evidence of this, see Defendant's response to

Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents (R 95), in which
Defendant denied having any documents at all except tax forms,
which he refused to allow Plaintiff to copy in direct denial of
Rule 34 (a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states
that the party making the request may inspect and copy the
documents requested.

Defendant's failure to provide financial

information is also evidenced by Defendant's failure to file a
Financial Declaration as he was ordered by the Notice of Pre-Trial
10

Settlement Hearing (R 83) .
The child support award was examined closely in the
hearing on Defendant's Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment.

This is evidenced by

the changes in the child support provisions from the originally
proposed Findings of Fact, in which Plaintiff was to receive a
percentage of Defendant's income above the base amount (R 217220) , and the Findings of Fact entered by the court (R 325-326).
The trial court had available to it evidence concerning
all the factors set out in Section 78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated
(1984), and most were reviewed by counsel and the court in
chambers prior to the trial as well as at the hearing on
Defendant's Objection to the first proposed set of findings and
those presented to the court were incorporated in the Findings of
Fact ultimately entered by the court.

Paragraph 48 of the

Findings of Fact covers the wealth and income of the Defendant,
Paragraph 49 covers the wealth and income of the Plaintiff,
Paragraph 50 covers the situation of the child and Plaintiff and
the need of the obligee (R 326). Again, to the extent Defendant
had evidence indicating otherwise, he should have presented this
at trial.
As for the factors that the trial court did not include
in its Findings of Fact, the age of the parties was apparent to
11

the court, since both were present at the trial, and the
responsibility of the obligor for the support of others was not
brought out, even though the court sought out this information
prior to the trial by requiring that Defendant file a Financial
Declaration (R 8 3 ) , which was never done.

The Defendant neither

proffered evidence nor testified concerning his living situation*
The Plaintiff did testify that the Defendant was living with
another woman (TR 2 2), but there was no testimony concerning
Defendant's support of her or his duty to support her.

Indeed,

Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories to Defendant
indicate that Defendant was residing only with a friend (R 110),
and had Defendant provided Plaintiff with any of the records that
Plaintiff asked for in her Request for Production of Documents,
any payments that he was making for the support of others would
have been clear, but no documents were supplied (R 95-99).
At trial the court left open the issue of child support
in order to determine whether Defendant would continue his
employment at the same level of income pending confirmation of his
income from the Director of Human Resources (TR 23,24).

His

continued employment at the same level of income was subsequently
verified (R 139). The amount of support to be ultimately paid by
Defendant was determined using the Utah Child Support guidelines
in effect at that time with the analysis thoroughly explained in
12

the Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R 257, 258) and Findings
of Fact (TR 326, 327). Thus, the amount of child support awarded
by the trial court should be upheld.
Again, in Defendant's second point on appeal he is
arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the Findings,
but the Defendant has again failed to marshall any evidence
contrary to the Findings entered by the court.

Since stipulations

and representations were entered into in the judge's chambers, and
no evidence of what was heard or decided in chambers has been
provided to this appellate court, the Findings entered by the
trial court should be upheld in accordance with Bake, supra p.7.

Point III
THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS PROPER
The propriety of the restraining order against Defendant
appears in Appellant's brief as the third issue under Appellant's
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal.
authority is presented.

However, no argument or

Nevertheless, Plaintiff believes this was

proper and supported by the parties' stipulations in chambers and
testimony presented during trial that protective services ordered
Defendant out of the marital residence (TR 21). Accordingly, the
permanent restraining order should be upheld.

13

Point IV
THE REQUIREMENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE WAS PROPER
In its Order Affirming Commissioner's Recommendations (R
38), the court ordered Defendant maintain his present policy of
life insurance.

In Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's

Interrogatories to Defendant, Defendant stated that he had life
insurance, but that some would lapse in six months from the date
of the Answers (R 106), given this evidence, which was available
to the court as well as the evidence presented concerning life
insurance presented at trial (TR 15), and the prior Temporary
Order and Defendant's failure to comply with the Order, an order
to provide life insurance was appropriate.
Point V
THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ASSETS WAS PROPER
The division of the remaining items of property not
previously divided by the parties is explained in detail in
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities given to the
trial court (R 133-203).

Essentially, the only assets that needed

a court decision consisted of the parties' home, pre-dissolution
pension plan payments for which Defendant failed to account, and
the remaining payments due under Defendant's pension.
The parties stipulated to the value of the marital
residence, and evidence was proffered and unrefuted concerning the
14

value of the pension.

The court made extensive findings

explaining its division of the marital assets (R 316-324), as
required by Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah Ct. App.,
1988).

Specifically, the court found that the entire pension was

a marital asset.

Defendant argues in his brief that Defendant

worked for nine months at Kennecott prior to the parties'
marriage, but Defendant offered no testimony that any portion of
the pension vested during this period, and it was within the
court's discretion to determine that the pension was entirely a
marital asset.

The court also awarded the entire marital

residence, having a value of $37,000 to the Plaintiff, and awarded
the pension payments received by Defendant prior to the hearing
but after the separation of the parties to the Defendant, finding
that none of these payments had been used for family expenses. The
court then determined that interest should accrue on the predissolution pension payments and added simple interest at 10% to
the amounts received, and valued the total at $20,300.86.

The

court further determined, based upon the expert testimony of
Charles E. Peterson of Frank Stuart and Associates proffered at
trial, that the present value of the future pension benefits to be
paid was $76,328.31.

The fact that the entirety of the house was

awarded to Plaintiff is not in itself inequitable. See Bailey v.
Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah Ct. App., 1987) and King v. King, 717
15

P.2d 715 (Utah, 1986).
Defendant, in his brief relies on Woodward v. Woodward,
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), but the pension in Woodward was not
vested, indeed, the Plaintiff in Woodward would have had to work
an additional 15 y e a r s before his pension would vest.

Woodward at

431.
In the instant case the pension was fully vested and its
value determined.

In Bailey, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated

that a present value is calculable if the only contingency is the
life expectancy of the retire, but when there are other
contingencies distribution should be postponed, I^U_ at 831.

In

this case the only contingency is the life expectancy of the
Defendant, and a division of the entire pension may be had.

In

the present case the pension is being distributed and the question
is only what percentage should each party get of the pension
proceeds.

The court made an evaluation of the value of the

marital assets that remained undistributed and determined that the
Plaintiff could be awarded the house in which she and the minor
child resided, so long as the amount of pension that she receives
from the Defendant's pension was reduced accordingly.

The court

made its division according to the undisputed evidence at trial.
The reviewing court should not disturb the trial court's
apportionment of marital property unless it is clearly unjust or
16

an abuse of discretion.

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d. 1076 (Utah,

1988). Indeed, absent a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion, a reviewing court will not interfere with a property
award. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. ,
1988).
The Defendant argues that since no evidence was
presented at trial that the income received from the Defendant's
pension by the Defendant during the time of separation was not
hidden or not accounted for, that the court's consideration of
this amount in making the property awards was an abuse of
discretion.

In making this argument the Defendant relies on

Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App., 1989).

The facts

in Johnson are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the
instant case. In Johnson the parties stipulated to a division of
property in which all the property to be divided was listed, the
court determined that property that both parties knew about, but
which was not on the list, need not be divided.

In the present

case there is no stipulation concerning the division of the
pension and the Plaintiff has been seeking a portion of the
Defendant's retirement since the filing of the Complaint (R 16).
Defendant received monthly payments totalling more than
$18,000.00 from his pension during the parties' separation.

This

clearly reduced the present value of the pension as it would have
17

been determined at the time of separation from the actual
determination at the time of trial.

"Although assets are

generally valued at the time of the divorce decree, the trial
court may value the property at an earlier date where one party
has dissipated an asset, . . . " Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d
476, 477 (Utah Ct. App., 1988).

The court found that Defendant

had taken this money and that he had failed to make an accounting
of it (R 318). Since no accounting was made, it was within the
court's discretion to determine that none of the amounts received
were used for family expenses, and that therefore the entire
amount could be used in dividing the marital property. See,
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App., 1988).
The court also had the right to add interest to the
amount received by Defendant from his pension.

The court used a

10% simple interest calculation as prescribed by Utah Code
Annotated Section 15-1-1 (1985).

In Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d

649 (Utah Ct. App., 1987) the court determined that interest had
to be charged on back child support judgments. In Marchant v.
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App., 1987), the Utah Court of
Appeals held that interest on a property award should be at the
statutory rate. Since the pension was one-half Plaintiff's in this
case, she was entitled to receive payments when they were received
by Defendant. Since none of these payments were received by her or
18

paid for family expenses, she should be entitled to receive the
statutory rate of interest on the amounts received.

This is only

fair because these pre-dissolution pension paynebts were not used
by Defendant for family expenses and could have been invested by
Plaintiff had she received her fair share.

Thus, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in imputing interest on this amount
and crediting this to Defendants side of the ledger
The Defendant argues that there was no award as to the
distribution of the residence at the trial, but again, he has
failed to muster all the evidence of what happened at trial.

What

occurred in the court chambers does not appear in the record, and
the Defendant's argument as to the insufficiency of the evidence
should fail under the rationale of Bake, supra, at 7.

Point VI
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS WAS PROPER
The issue of attorney's fees was discussed in chambers
by counsel and the court. The court decided that $1,500.00 in
attorney's fees should be awarded.

This award may have been based

partly on the general need of the Plaintiff as established in her
unrefuted Financial Declaration and partly on the unresolved issue
of attorney's fees incurred in compelling Defendant's answers and
responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests which had been
19

reserved for trial in the Order Compelling Discovery (R 79-80).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) (4) states that if a Motion to
Compel Discovery is granted, the court shall require the opposing
party to "pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred
in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court
finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust."

The court never entered any finding that Defendant's

opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order Compelling Answers to
Interrogatories and Reply to Request for Production of Documents
was justified or that an award of expenses was unjust.

Indeed,

the Plaintiff might have pursued this matter further given the
answers that Defendant gave to the Interrogatories and his utter
failure to produce documents.
In order to recover attorney's fees the moving party
must set forth the reasonableness of the award and the need of the
requesting party. Sorenson, supra p. 8. The Findings indicate that
the fees requested were reasonable and that they were necessary,
setting forth the requirements for necessity in its findings.
Indeed, Plaintiff had sought an award of $4,000.00 (R 328), but
the court awarded only $1,500.00.

Plaintiff's need is evidenced

in her Financial Declaration which should be held as true and
correct given Defendant's failure to file any such statement.
20

Defendant contends that Plaintiff should not have been
awarded its costs incurred in filing the action of $82.00 because
she did not submit a Bill of Costs as required under Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 54 (d). However, this is the first time any
objection has been made by Appellant on the issue of costs.

In

Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and to Decree of Divorce and Judgment Defendant objected only to
the judgment of $1,500.00 awarded Plaintiff for her attorney's
fees and nothing was said about the costs of court.

Because of

Defendant's failure to object to the costs of court incurred by
Plaintiff, he should be deemed to have waived this objection.
Suniland Corporation v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847 (Utah, 1978).

See

also State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App., 1988).
Point VII
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS PROPER
Since the court ordered an equitable division of the
pension at the trial, and the valuation of the pension was dated
for September, 1988, the court properly awarded the Plaintiff a
judgment for the amount she should have received from the date of
trial up to the entering of the Decree of Divorce and Judgment.
Had the court failed to award this judgment, the pension
division set forth in the decree would have been inequitable by
allowing the Defendant to receive an inequitable share of the
21

marital property received by him after the date of trial but prior
to the entry of the Decree. Plaintiff argues that to do otherwise
would be contrary to the requirement that the Defendant should be
required to account for marital property dissipated prior to the
divorce as set out in Anderson, supra p.17.

Since it is the

court's duty to divide property equitably, Utah Code Annotated,
section 30-3-5, it would have been an abuse of discretion not to
have some accounting of all the pension funds received by
Defendant.
Point VIII
THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAL WERE NOT
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW
The Defendant had ample opportunity to raise objections
to the proposed final Decree of Divorce and Judgment.

Indeed, the

court asked the Defendant to supply a Reply Memoreindum responding
to Plaintiff f s Memorandum of Points and Authoriti€>s, and since the
court received no such memorandum, it asked the Plaintiff to
prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce and Judgment in compliance with the memorandum which the
Plaintiff had prepared pursuant to the Defendant's original
objections on the sufficiency of the evidence.

Since the

Defendant made no objections to the Memorandum or to the second
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and
22

Judgment, the court could only have decided that all problems that
the Defendant had with the originally proposed findings and decree
had been resolved by the second findings and decree.
Defendant's objections to the first Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment were mostly
based on the sufficiency of the evidence, but the Defendant did
not order a transcript so that the court could determine the facts
that had been introduced into evidence.

Since the Defendant

failed to provide any evidence supporting his arguments on the
sufficiency of the evidence, the court could not have decided in
Defendant's favor, but the court allowed the Defendant an
opportunity to make his argument by asking for a memorandum in
which he would support his arguments, but the Defendant produced
no such memorandum.
Since the Defendant's objections were not pursued
through preparing a memorandum or objecting to the second Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment,
and since the Defendant never supported his arguments to the court
by references to the evidence, Defendant's objections should not
be preserved for review on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant failed to show the District Court how the
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and
Judgment would harm the Defendant or be an undue burden, even
though he was asked to show his need and argue his point through
Interrogatories, Financial Declarations, testimony/ a memorandum
of points and authorities and through the availability of an
objection to the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce and Judgment.

Defendant failed to act on his

own behalf in the lower court, and Plaintiff asks that he be
prevented from acting now that the case is on appeal, and uphold
the decision of the Third District Court and award costs to
Respondent.
b

7

M. DIRK EASTMOND
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
140 West 9000 South
Suite 8
Sandy, Utah 84070
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
r, EILEEN D. OTTI, do hereby certify that on the Y&—
day o f O U ^ ^ t 1989, I hand delivered four (4) true and correct
copies o'r the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, to
DON BLACKHAM
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
3535 South 3200 West Street
West Valley City, Utah 84119
^

^

.

^

^

EILEEN D. OTTI
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
FAYE DORIS HURST,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 890129-CA

vs.
LARRY W. HURST,
Defendant and
Appellant.

ADDENDUM TC RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
****************************

APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO, THIRD DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

M. DIRK EASTMOND (951)
EILEEN D. OTTI (5330)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and R e s p o n d e n t
140 West 9000 South
Suite 8
Sandy, Utah 84070
DON BLACKHAM (356)
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah

84119

SERVE UPON DPHOMf. COUNSEL AT LEAST
F l t X D IN C L E R K S OFFICE R V E ® DAy S BEFORE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.

In the Third Judical iBwfrwt>t€6tett of Salt Lake County
FAY DORIS KURST

„

..„_.„

.Case No D 8 7 - 3 2 0 0

ierfc|3rd Di&t Ccurt

Deputy ciefi financial Declaration

vs.

LARRY W. hURST
Defendant

Dated.

5-24-88

Husband:
Wifc.

Address

Fay
D o rSouth
i s H u r5120
st
5242
West

Address:

Kearns, Utah 84118
Soc. Sec. No .

Soc. Sec. No.:

528-48-0752

Occupation _

Occupation. C l a s s i f i e d Ads R e p r e s e n t a t i v e

Employer:

Employer.

Birthdate:

Birthdate:

Newspaper Agency C o r p o r a t i o n
3/4/38

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED
WILL AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY
AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive it monthly figures wfcen Income ts received and deductions are
made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on • bi-weekly basis, multiply by 2.167)
I.

HUSBAND

Gross monthly income from
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses.
allowances and overtime, payable
period)
—
Pensions and retirement
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare. AFDC payments, etc.)
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
Rents
AH other sources (Specify)

$
(pay

1,119.00 |

5
TOIAI MONIHI Y INCOME

Average of 1987
$

Itemize monthly deductions from gross income
Stale and federal income uxes
Number of exemptions taken
Social security

Medical or other insurance (describe fully) H e a l t h

Accident 34,50. L-Teito P i s $7.95
Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan

—
_

WIFE

$

$58,44,

Life

$

s

1,119.00
1
154.00 J
2
83.00

$8 .25

79.14

Other

(specify)

rOIAl
3

4

Net monthtx

MONTHLY

imome

s
$

DEDUCTIONS

S

316.14

'802.86

lake home pax

Debts and obligations
Creditor's Name

Date Payable

For

NAC Credit Union
Trane Co. Credit Union
ZCMI
M. Dirk Eastmond
Vallev Mental Health

Monthlv Payment

Balance

$666.00
529.00
260.00
1,200.00
ISO 00
s

TOTAI

$66.00
64.00
30.00
?2 nn
s

2,805.00

182.00

(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5

All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held ( H ) H u s b a n d (W)Wife (J) Jomtlv)
W H E R E S P A C E IS I N S U F F I C I E N T FOR C O M P L E T E I N F O R M A T I O N OR L I S T I N G P L E A S E A T T A C H S E P A R A T E S C H E D U L F
Value
(a) Household furnishings, furniture.
appliances, and equipment

(b) Automobile (Year-Make)

(c) Securities - stocks

2,000.00
300.00
250.00

' 7 8 Plymouth Sapparo (Fay d r i v e s )

'75 Ford Pinto (Larry has)
76 Chevey Pickup & camper & s h e l l (Larry lias)

Owed Thereon

•0-

_1_, 100.00

bonds

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans,
credit unions - savings and checking)

Guardian State Bank (average)

LOO.00

(e) Life Insurance

? '

Equitable
NAC

(0

Face A m o u n t

Policy No

Name of C o m p a n y

Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts

Name _Xennecott. R e t i r e m e n t

s

1.000
13.000

C a s h value, accumulated
dividend, or loan a m o u n t

0
_Q

Value of interest and a m o u n t presently vested

$83,114 (present valnp)

Name
(g) Other Personal P r o p c m and Assets (spetiK )

guns, cameras,

develapijig^_£.q.uipment_,

sewing machine,

Larry's possession which are worth $4,000 00

tools, _all

in

(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned attach sheet with identical information for all additional propertv)
Address

5242 South 1?0 Wpgf

Type of Property

h o u s e

2/59

Date of Acquisition
Original Cost S 1 0 , 7 7 5 . 0 0

Total Present Value S 4 0 , 0 0 0

Cost of Additions $

Basis of Valuation

Total Cost $

1 , 000 . 00

Mtg Balance S

Q_
Q_

-

4_5L, 0 0 0

EsJtate.

RrokPT- S

opinion

11 , 775 . 00

Other Liens $

Real

Equity $ __Afl,000 - 4 5 , 0 0 0
Monthly Amortization S

Taxes $

U

And to whom

538 p e r y e a r

Individual contributions

(i) Business interest (Indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

IN O n e

(j) Other assets (Specify)

Personal effects, Jewelry

6

Total monthlv expenses '(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose
expenses are included )
HUSBAND

WIFb

Mother, Kaylene Hurst:
_Q_

Rent or mortgage pavments (residence)
Real propcrtN taxes (residence)

538 per year

Real property insurance (residence)

$200 per

}^ear

when

,44.83
16.67

affordable

Food and household supplies

25.00
200.00

Utilities including water electricity, gas and heat

150.00 J

Telephone

50.00
25.00
100 00
20 . 00
20.00

Maintenance (residence)

_$300,,per year

Laundry and cleaning

Clothing contingent on a b i l i t y
Medical estimated
Dcmai estimated, minor child needs f i l l i n g s
Insurance (life health undent comprehensive haJuJitw^
disabilit\) Fxcludc Pa\ roll Deducted

re

,

,

,

^r ^

o r

I , .n .

A-> ^r-

__ I
neaith » b z . ^Accideik
, D i s a b i$4,50
l i t y i?/.K

^D.DU,

Child careol child spous il support re prior marriage
Payment
School
I ntertammem (includes clubs social obligations, travel rev nation)
Incidentals (grooming tobacco alcohol gifts and donations)

Tr.nsporui.on (other than automob.ic) bus when car needs r e p a i r
Auto expense (gas oil repair insurance) C 3 T n e e d S

^ .

OVernaUl

Auto payments
Installment payment(s) (Insert total and attach itemized schedule
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)

JKK30
50.00
0
14.00
30.00
25.00
5.00
120.00
__D
182.00

Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule)
TOTA1 EXPENSFS

1,157.80

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah

v-

(ma
Type of hearing: Div.
P r e s e n t ^ RJtf \A

\

Annul._
Deft..

Supp. Order_
Other T f c 1 PrU
OSC.„
Stipulation.
Summons,
Waiver
Publication.
•
DefaulLpf Pltf/Deft Entered

P- Atty:4j^ffiZ31M2
D. A t t y : " n ^ ^ V \ ^ A A \ £ Z

Sworn ^/Examined:
Pltf:
_jk-\
.
.
Deft: ; /
Others: K l f f i f 7 0 \A1 QJOA;
C XATJUJUU?
l »

si^^oa

CASE NO:

si

Date: _§tP t 0 198S
fc.

'

Judge:
fojfo/LS^Ierk-

vCLDS.UMO
LAVCi\v-£ ^ A C i A U

Rpnnr
Reporter:
K6A) /VltjfcAj
BailiffHARRY KLEKAS
Bailiff

ORDERS:
•
§3

Custody Evaluation Ordered
. JH Custody AwardedJTo J
Visitation Rights l l M / l / y u W C
tfiAL6UflA,
ft
£

D
•
D

PJtf/Deft Awarded Support $_
=
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $_
_ Per Month/Year
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:.
Atty. fees to t h e U l J A i AAXJH
Home Tcv
*

££
G

Per Month
Alimony Waived

in the amount of $A*rDO
*I

/3/\r

!
v&~
~

VX^^^noo^W® pa+f^u

•
•
n
•
•
•
•
!$
^
CJ

Furnishings To:
Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft, to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft, to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against
Pltf/Deft, Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $.
90-Day Waiting Period i
Divorce Granted To
As
Decree To Become Fina:
LJ 3-Month Interlocutory
§5 Upon Entry )
Former Name of _

LJ

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft.
Bait.
Returnabfe

LJ

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

LJ

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiffs counsel, court orders

L&TJ&!UAX1JJ

aoA \VvVo WJL vuirtA. Is Restored

UNIVERSITY CLUB BUILDING
136 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 1530
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 531-6222

1500 EAST BETHANY HOME ROAD
SUITE 130
PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85014
(602) 230-2333

*

fTxd(£i

i
>6r

1988

Dirk Eastmondf Esq.
Sandy State Bank Building
140 West 9000 South, Suite
Sandy, UT 84070
Dear Mr. Eastraond:
At your request I have prepared an analysis at the
present value of the pension benefits accruing to Larry and Faye
Hurst from Kennecott. This analysis is based upon the following
facts and assumptions:
1.
A letter dated November 4, 1987 from J. Robert
Shields, Personnel Manager at Kennecott, indicated that Mr. Hurst
will receive a pension benefit of $754.51 per month to age 62.
Upon reaching age 62 the benefit will be reduced to $454.51 per
month through the end of his life. In the event of Mr. Hurst's
death, Mrs. Hurst will begin to receive $249.98 per month for th<
remainder of her life.
2. Larry Hurst is presently 54 years of age, and has a
life expectancy of 22.5 years. Faye Hurst is presently 50 years
of age. If Mrs. Hurst is alive at the end of Mr. Hurst's life
expectancy, she will then have a life expectancy of 13.2 years.
The probability that she will be alive in 22.5 years is
approximately 77.77 percent. Life expectancies are based upon
statistics prepared by the National Center for Health Statistics
for 1985.
3. A discount rate of 8.1 percent compounded monthly
is based upon short, medium, and long term U.S. government
securities. This represents a relatively risk-free rate of
return"a person could expect to receive over periods of time
reflected in the forecasts included with this letter.

Based upon these facts and assumotions, the October lf
1988 present value of Mr* Hurst's future Kennecott retirement
benefit from the beginning of 1988 through the end of his life
expectancy amounts to $76,328* The October 1, 1938 present value
of Mrs. Hurst's retirement benefit from the end of Mr. Hurst's
life expectancy to the end of her own life expectancy is $4 f 057.
Reducing Mrs. Hurst's pension benefit based upon the 77.77
percent probability she will live to the end of L^rry Hurst's
life expectancy yields $3,155.
The value of Mr. Hurst's retirement benefit since
August 1986 through September 1988 (26 months) is $21,343 when
accumulated at 8 percent interest, and $19,617.26 without
interest.
Schedules detailing these calculations are enclosed
with this letter.
matter.

Thank you for the opportunity to assist you in this
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Best regards,

•'

//

/>

/J -

Charles E. Peterson
kh
Enclosures

LARRY W. HURST
PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE KENNECOTT PENSION
DISCOUNT RATE =
.08100
DATE OF CALCULATION SEPTEMBER 2 4 , 1988
PRESENT VALUE AS OF OCTOBER 1 , 1988

DATE

VALUE AT
PRESENT VALUE DATE

DISCOUNT
FACTOR

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

2,233.31
8,495.87
7,836.97
7,229.17
6,668.51
6,151.33
5,674.26
5,234.19
3,465.23
2,682.93
2,474.85
2,282.91
2,105.86
1,942.54
1,791.89
1,652.92
1,524.72
1,406.47
1,297.39
1,196.77
1,103.96
1,018.34
857.89

.980020
.904015
.833903
.769230
.709572
.654541
.603778
.556952
.513757
.473912
.437158
.403254
.371980
.343131
.316519
.291971
.269327
.248440
.229172
.211398
.195003
.179880

TOTALS;

76,328.31

VALUE AT
BEGINNING
OF YEAR
2,233.31
8,669.07
8,669.07
8,669.07
8,669.07
8,669.07
8,669.07
8,669.07
6,221.77
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
5,222.17
4,769.25

ANNUAL
AMOUNT
2,263.53
9,054.12
9,054.12
9,054.12
9,054.12
9,054.12
9,054.12
9,054.12
6,498.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5.454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
5,454.12
4,963.25
148,007.30

A u g u s t 1936 t o S e p t e m b e r 1988 p e n s i o n o a y n e n t s
a c c u m u l a t e d a t 8 p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t amount t o $ 2 1 , 3 4 3
or $19,617 w i t h o u t i n t e r e s t .

FAYE HURST
PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE KENNECOTT PENSION
DISCOUNT RATE =
.08100
DATE OF CALCULATION SEPTEMBER 24, 1988
PRESENT VALUE AS OF NOVEMBER 28, 2010

DATE

VALUE AT
PRESENT VALUE DATE

DISCOUNT
FACTOR

VALUE AT
BEGINNING
OF YEAR

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

268.10
2,851.40
2,630.26
2,426.27
2,238.10
2,064.52
1,904.40
1,756.71
1,620.47
1,494.79
1,378.86
1,271.92
1,173.28
1,082.29
113.80

.992761
.915767
.844744
.779230
.718797
.663050
.611627
.564192
.520436
.480073
.442841
.408497
.376815
.347591

2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
2,872.19
327.41

TOTALS:

24,275.15

268.10

Present Value As Of October 1, 1980:
Probability Mrs. Hurst Surviving
To November 2 010:

ANNUAL
AMOUNT

269.98
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
2,999.76
329.97
39,596.83

$4,057
x .7777
$3,]55

1

I SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER

26TH, 1988; 10:30 A.M.

2
3

THE COURT:

THIS IS THE CASE OF FAYE DORIS HURST VERSUS

4

LARRY W. HURST, D87-3200.

5

FOR THE RECORD?

CAN WE HAVE COUNSEL

IDENTIFY THEMSEL

6

MR. EASTMOND:

DIRK EASTMOND, APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

7

MR. BLACKHAM:

DON BLACKHAM, APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANT.

8

THE COURT:

9

THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW THAT THE COURT HAD

BOTH COUNSEL IN CHAMBERS AND WE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER QUITE

1°

THOROUGHLY AND THERE'S CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN

11

MADE.

12

THEN PROFFER TO THE COURT WHAT THEY WOULD TESTIFY TO.

13

14

MR. EASTMOND:
J

THE COURT:

15

THE COURT:

24

EXCEPT FOR THE PARTIES, THOSE ARE ALL WIT-

HAVE THE PARTIES SWORN, TOO.

RAISE YOUR HAND

AND BE SWORN.
(THE WITNESSES WERE SWORN.)

21

23

AND THEN -- MAYBE WE CAN SWEAR ALL THE WITNESSE

NESSES.

20

22

ALL RIGHT.

MR. EASTMOND:

18
19

IDENTIFY THEM AND

IN RIGHT NOW.

16

17

SO IF YOU CAN HAVE YOUR WITNESSES

THE COURT:

NOW, THE COURT HAS INDICATED TO COUNSEL THAT

WHAT THE COURT WOULD LIKE TO DO IS HAVE COUNSEL TALK WITH YOU
J INFORMALLY OUTSIDE, BUT YOU T RE UNDER OATH SO YOU ARE REQUIRED
BY THE COURT TO TflL

'5 1

WE

GET

THE

MATT£R

T

HE TRUTH AND

^FILLJ.

THIS WILL BF CONTINUED UNTIL

SO YOU MAY i\01 BE HERE.

\ s s < K I \1 I D PKOPI s s i ( ) \ \ i
S\l

0 K E A h \ s HU t l\v.
l \KL v. ITN M \H

KM POK 1 ! K s

